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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1952
the right to appeal from a judgment which reversed and vacated the board's
decision. The court pointed out that a township board of zoning appeals
is a statutory board deriving its power from Sections 3180-37'to 3180-39
of the Ohio General Code, inclusive, and that those statutes contain no
language expressly conferring upon the board any right to appeal from a
judgment of a court or even to participate as a party in an appeal from one
of its decisions. 8
Criminal Appellate Procedure
As usual, a number of criminal appeals were considered by the Ohio
Supreme Court and the courts of appeals during the year. However, only
one seemed to be worthy of special mention because of its procedural as-
pects. In this case, State v. Thesemn,' the defendant was committed to the
Lima State Hospital for examination and report for a period of not more
than sixty days in conformity with Section 13451-20 of the Ohio General
Code. This commitment was made after conviction but before sentence,
and the'defendant filed an appeal on questions of law from the commitment
order. The state moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was
not taken from a judgment or after sentence on the judgment. The court of
appeals overruled the motion to dismiss and, although no exact precedent
for its action could be found, held that the order of reference made after con-
viction but before sentence was incident to the final imposition of sentence;
and, therefore, being part and parcel of the final sentence, was a judgment
having the attributes of a sentence. Therefore, it was held to be an ap-
pealable order.
CLARE DEWiTr RUSSELL
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Jurisdiction of Common Pleas Courts
What would appear to be a limitation upon the jurisdiction of common
pleas courts was established in a decision of the court of appeals in Servce
Transport Co. v. Matyas.1 The plaintiff brought an action in replevin in
the common pleas court against the administratrix of a decedents estate
to recover certain personal property that the decedent held as bailee for
the plaintiff. The court explicitly stated that the only question before it
was whether a petition in a replevin action against an administratrix which
does not allege that the petitioner has presented his claim to the administra-
"A. DiCillo & Sons v. Chester Zoning Board of Appeals, 158 Ohio St. 302, 305,
109 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1952).
"91 Ohio App. 489, 108 N.E.2d 854 (1952).
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trix and that it has been rejected, or that if such course were followed such
action would be unavailing, states a good cause of action. The court held
that it does not.
The court relied upon Section 10501-53 of the Ohio General Code as
giving the probate court exclusive jurisdiction to direct and control the
conduct and settle the accounts of executors and administrators and to order
distribution of assets, and upon Section 10509-138 as forbidding suits
against such fiduciaries by a creditor or any other party interested in the
estate until after nine months except in five specified types of cases, of
which replevin was held not to be one. It analogized the situation before
it to the facts in Lsngler v. Wesco2 in which it was held that a chattel
mortgagee's rights to recover the mortgaged property in the custody of an
administrator by replevin action could not be pressed in the common pleas
court. In that case the court stated that, while death did not impair or re-
move the lien, it did cut off one of the remedies which could have been
pursued against the mortgagor.
Possibly the case could have been determined otherwise by taking a
different view of the second category of Section 10509-138 which permits
actions against the administrator to be brought in less than nine months
from the tune of his appointment "for the enforcement of a lien against or
zwolvng title to specific property." [Italics added]. That statutory ex-
ception had not been enacted at the time of the decision in the Lngler case.
Although of limited application, the present case may be of importance to
the practitioner since the result reached indicates that the common pleas
court has no jurisdiction over the action of replevin against an administra-
tor.
Survival of Actions
In Lewts v. St. Bernard3 the supreme court satisfactorily resolved an ap-
parent conflict between the factual situation therein presented and a prior
case, Cardington v. Fredercks,4 by its construction of Sections 11235, 11397
and 11401 of the Ohio General Code. The Cardington case had held that
an action against a municipal corporation under the provisions of Section
3714 of Ohio General Code (then Section 5144, Revised Statutes) for per-
sonal injuries suffered due to its failure properly to maintain a public street,
sounded in nuisance, and abated with the death of the injured plaintiff prior
to trial of an action commenced by her after injury. The court correctly
1108 N.E.2d 741 (Ohio App. 1952).
279 Ohio St. 225, 86 N.E. 1004 (1908).
'157 Ohio St. 549, 106 N.E.2d 554 (1952).
'46 Ohio St. 442, 21 N.E. 766 (1889)
1OHIO GEN. CODE § 11397 The amendment added the words "Unless otherwise
provided. "
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pointed out that since the date of the Cardington case, Section 11397 had
been amended5 so as to permit the application of section 11235 which
I causes of action for injuries to the person shall survive. "
Thus an action for personal injuries based on nuisance can survive the plain-
tiffs death under provisions of Section 11401. Although not expressly
overruled, the Cardington case appears now to have become of historical in-
terest only.
Service of Process
In Meeker v. Werner the court of appeals held that the provisions of
Section 6308 of the Ohio General Code pertaining to service of process upon
a defendant who resides in a county other than that in which the action is
brought by virtue of the venue provisions of Section 6308 in an action
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in Ohio requires that such process
be served by the sheriff of the county in which the defendant resides. Ser-
vice by the sheriff of the county in which the action is brought, or the
bailiff of the mumcipal court, will not, in the absence of some kind of
waiver or general appearance by such a defendant, afford a basis of juris-
diction for the trial court to render judgment against him.
Joinder of Defendants
The Ohio Supreme Court in Meyer v. Cincinati Street Ry.7 was again
faced with the problem of what constitutes proper joinder of defendants.
Ohio General Code Section 11255 states that "any person may be made a
defendant who has or claims an interest in the controversy adverse to the
plaintiff, or who is a necessary party to a complete determination or settle-
ment of a question involved therein." The court stated that where an
injury is proximately caused by the independent but concurrent wrongful
acts of two or more persons, joint liability arises, and the wrongdoers may
be joined as defendants, even though they have not acted in concert in the
carrying out of a common purpose. Furthermore, joinder will not be pre-
cluded even though the want of care of such defendants is not of the same
character. Thus, the court expressly overruled the doctrine established in
Stark County Agricultural Society v. Brenners that, "joint liability for tort
only lies where wrongdoers have acted in concert in the execution of a com-
mon purpose and where the want of care of each is of the same character as
the want of care of the other."
Statute of Limitations
Despite the elementary principle of tort law that no matter what
breaches B may commit of a duty to A, no liability results until A suffers
'89 Ohio App. 520, 103 N.E.2d 296 (1951).
'157 Ohio St. 38, 104 N.E.2d 173 (1952).
'122 Ohio St. 560, 172 N.E. 659 (1930).
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injury from the act or omission which constituted the breach of duty, the
question of when a cause of action accrues for malpractice by a physician
often has proved troublesome. In DeLong v. CampbelP the supreme court
again was faced with the malpractice issue.
The case decided, probably with finality in Ohio unless the legislature
should amend Section 11225 of the Ohio General Code, that an action
against a physician by his patient for malpractice does not accrue at the
time of discovery of the forgotten sponge, scalpel or tube that the doctor
leaves inside his unconscious patient. Whether the cause of action accrues
at the tine of the delict or at the tune when treatment of the patient by the
physician ends (which, of course, may be much later than the date of the
operation) is in the opinion of the writer still unsettled in Ohio. The court
is probably at present favoring the theory that continued treatment of a pa-
tient after an operation which has been, unknown to the panent, improperly
performed will extend the statute.
Pleading a Statutory Cause of Action
It is seldom at this late date in the development of the law of code
pleading that a court has an opportunity to decide an issue exclusively con-
cerned with pleading. In In re Single County Dtch,0 the Ohio Supreme
Court enunciated, apparently for the first tune in Ohio, the rule already well
established in many code jurisdictions, that when a plaintiff substantially
relies upon a statute to constitute his cause of action, and the statute con-
tains a true exception, he must plead the exception, and, of course, carry
the burden of proving compliance with it. If, however, the exculpatory
language of the statute is in the form of a "proviso," the matters to be estab-
lished under it are defensive in character, and must be alleged and proved by
the defendants. In the particular case the court found the words of Section
6486 of the Ohio General Code to be of the defensive type and excused the
plaintiff from the duty of having to allege and prove his compliance with
them.
Notice of Appeal
In a case of first instance in Ohio the court of appeals in Schutt v.
Blankenshp 1' held that Ohio General Code Section 11297-1 providing for
service of writs and process by mail is not applicable to service of notice of
appeal. Letters mailed to the trial court and to the appellate court prior to
the expiration of the 20 day period for filing nonce of appeal did not meet
the requirements of section 12223-7 of the Ohio General Code. While the
* 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952)
0 157 Ohio St. 446, 105 N.E.2d 873 (1952)
=107 N.E.2d 218 (Ohio App. 1951).
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case could probably have been equally well decided on the basis that mail-
ing was not the equivalent of filing, the decision is in line with authority
elsewhere.
Foreign Corporation: Service Upon
The problem of due process with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction
by state courts over foreign corporations doing business in a state confronted
the supreme court in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.12 In a
prior hearing before the supreme court, 3 that court upheld the court of
appeals in granting the motion of the defendant foreign corporation to
quash the service of summons upon the defendant in an action brought by
a nonresident upon a claim which did not arise out of the company's doing
business in Ohio nor was related to its activities here. Service of process had
not been made upon a designated statutory agent since the corporation had
designated none but upon its "president and general manager."
Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court and upon
hearing on the merits that court held that the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution left the Ohio court free to determine whether
it would take jurisdiction over the foreign corporation.' 4
Upon remission, the Supreme Court of Ohio in the principal case' 5 over-
ruled its previous decision in the case. Thus it held that in the absence of a
statute limiting jurisdiction of Ohio courts to causes of action arising with-
in this state' 6 a suit on a transitory cause of action may be maintained in
the courts of this state by a nonresident against a foreign corporation do-
ing business here, although the cause did not arise here or relate to the cor-
poration's business transacted here.
Garnishment: Restriction of Statutory Right
In Marq us v. Ne-w York Life Insurance Co." the court of appeals had
before it a case which appears to be of first instance in Ohio on its facts.
A divorced wife sought to enforce against an insurance company which had
insured her divorced husband's life a judgment indebtedness which she held
against her former spouse. The policy had a cash surrender value of
$733.43, but there was no evidence that the insured debtor had surrendered
' 158 Ohio St. 145, 107 N.E.2d 203 (1952).
"Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 155 Ohio St. 116, 98 N.E.2d 33
(1951).
'Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 Sup. Ct. 413
(1951).
'See note 12 supra.
"E.g., the venue provisions which led to such a result in Loftus v. Pennsylvania
RLR, 107 Ohio St. 352, 140 N.E. 94 (1923)
"92 Ohio App. 389, 108 N.E.2d 227 (1952).
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